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Introduction
Colombians struggle to describe their nation in ways that will be true to a kaleidoscopic reality. Multiple generations have despaired of fratricidal cycles of violence. Criminal impunity and corruption are endemic. Deep divisions persist. Yet the country is modern, with a well-functioning financial sector, a good urban infrastructure, and a sophisticated, if unequal, health system. Colombian jurists have a reputation for thoughtfulness and innovation. The nation's libraries and museums are beacons of culture and of optimism about the nation's future. Through recent decades marked by war, Colombian artists, musicians, and writers have produced enduring works and gained an international audience.
This emphasis on multiplicity and contradiction will be familiar to many who know Colombia. The country is very regionally distinct, and our aim in part I is to introduce readers to the mental map Colombians have in their minds when they project their own lives onto the canvas of nationhood. Just as educated New Yorkers imagine themselves as living within a nation that includes the history of New England's fisheries, Mark Twain's stories about the Mississippi River, and Wyoming's wide expanses, so residents of Bogotá look eastward and know that on the other side of the mountains lie broad plains, home to a tradition analogous to that of the Argentine pampa, or the ranching land of northern Mexico, and similarly described in song and story. Bogotanos also think themselves westward, across Andean peaks sometimes visible from the city itself, still snow-topped in the present but likely to lose their snow in coming generations. Their "West" extends first toward the ports of the Magdalena River, the country's transport artery and a symbol of layered cultural forms in music and dance, and second to the Cauca River Valley and the rainforest regions of the country's Pacific lowlands. Well-read city dwellers have in their minds images created by famous writers such as José Eustacio Rivera, Jorge Isaacs, and Candelario Obeso. Similarly, families in cities such as Medellín and Cali understand their nation as including Caribbean traditions that they might experience by taking a long bus trip northward, or perhaps by reading a novel by Gabriel García Márquez, as well as an Amazonian expanse that they are more likely to see 
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Introduction 3 on television or in the 2015 Oscar-nominated film by Ciro Guerra, Embrace of the Serpent, than to visit by flying to Colombia's southernmost region. Conversely, the geographic awareness that teachers communicate to schoolchildren in Buenaventura, a port city on the Pacific Coast, or Leticia, the regional capital of Amazonas department, is one that involves a view from the periphery toward the cities of the nation's interior-vastly different in their built environment than what people in faraway provinces or departments would find familiar. 1 Nevertheless, in the present a palpable sense of nation links Colombians to one another. Knit together by a thriving media industry and by mandated school curricula, people know that they live in a large and diverse nation.
Colombians also know that their country boasts stunning natural beauty and a system of national parks. The diversity of climates produced by the country's wide range of altitudes yields rich terrestrial, aquatic, and marine ecosystems: jungles, savannas, deserts, wetlands, and beaches, sometimes a few miles from each other, hold abundant natural resources and thousands of unique animal and plant species. Yet many of these areas have long been largely off-limits for Colombians-remote areas of the country have been sites of gruesome violence, where unmarked graves mark the extent of the country's bloodshed.
Generations of Colombians have lived with this sense that their country holds terrible dangers. For some, that has meant restrictions on their mobility; for others, it has meant that the direct threat of violence has made staying in their homes impossible. At present, more than 5.7 million Colombiansover 15 percent of the country-have been internally displaced by the country's long-standing violence, and almost four hundred thousand have been made refugees beyond the country's borders. The nation has perhaps only recently begun to recognize itself in talk of reparations for victims and for refugees, but conflict in Colombia extends far back into the country's shared memory. Like the United States and Mexico, Colombia experienced devastating mid-nineteenth-century wars, with political consequences that stretched into the twentieth century. Of these, the War of the Thousand Days (La Guerra de los Mil Días), fought between Liberals and Conservatives from 1899 to 1903, was by far the bloodiest. Twenty-five years later, a terrible labor massacre in 1928, in which soldiers sent from the interior opened fire on striking banana workers, generated long years of recriminations. The Masacre de las Bananeras serves as a symbolic historical milestone for many Colombians, and, as with the War of the Thousand Days, diverging interpretations of 1928 colored political life for decades afterward.
The 1940s and 1950s are known by the term "La Violencia," which is used to describe what amounted to an undeclared war between Liberals and Conservatives. The human cost of La Violencia was enormous, with over 250,000 dead and scores of displaced families. Scholars tend to take the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 1948, as the event that triggered twenty years of extreme bipartisan carnage. The two political parties were heterogeneous in their makeup: Conservatives included Catholics sympathetic to a Falangist view of the world as well as those closer to a nineteenth-century kind of aristocratic authoritarianism, while Liberals ranged from anticommunist anglophiles and admirers of the United States' New Deal to socialists of various stripes.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Colombian politics were thoroughly permeated by the divisions of the Cold War, although the country avoided the outright dictatorship seen in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Colombia remained formally democratic, with Liberals and Conservatives trading power in a famous pact called the National Front (el Frente Nacional). La Violencia did not so much end as transform itself. Large sectors of the Colombian population found themselves excluded from formal politics. But by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the ideological divisions of earlier generations no longer provided much ground for understanding why so much blood was being spilled in Colombia. During the 1980s, it became clear that the violence Colombians lived with was about the drug trade as much as anything else. Paramilitary groups proliferated; later, a set of these right-wing groups joined to become the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Financed by mafia leaders and often working in concert with the Colombian military, the paras, as they came to be known, declared war on guerrilla groups and their perceived supporters. By the end of the twentieth century, all sides were getting their war chests from the United States, whether as "dirty money" earned in the drug trade or as direct military and police aid, which added up to nearly $7 billion from the US government between 2000 and 2010. Reformists hailing from many different political positions often agreed with an idea expressed by García Márquez: "The Colombian drama is such that, to be exact, it is not possible to imagine that an end will be put to drugtrafficking, without consumption being legalized." Yet international politics Introduction 5 meant that decriminalizing drugs was not something the country could attempt on its own. Only after 2000 did a coalition of Latin American governments emerge to challenge the so-called war on drugs, with Colombian policy makers (and peace negotiators) taking a leading role.
Today, Colombians from different political backgrounds tend to agree that the high profits generated by illegal drugs made the violence of the last three decades exponentially worse. The flow of cocaine northward was met by a flow of arms southward, including pistols and assault rifles made in the United States and smuggled illegally into Colombia. Through the worst years, homicides averaged nine per day, giving Colombia the highest per capita murder rate in the world, in a context where murders were underreported. As evidence has emerged of clandestine cemeteries, especially in rural areas, the scale of such atrocities has become clearer. In Colombia, killings that occurred within the frame of guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare have included scores of civilians, murdered by military, paramilitary, and guerrilla forces alike. In one egregious set of scandals, signaled by the phrase "false positives," hundreds of young men were killed and their corpses presented by military commanders as evidence that guerrillas had been killed in combat. Yet many deaths continue to be linked in some way to the ongoing competition among drug trafficking organizations-all of them with ties to criminal networks in the cocaine-importing economies of the United States, Europe, and Brazil.
As was true in the nineteenth century and through the 1960s, the conflicts of recent memory have hit the rural poor hardest. Most displaced Colombians are poor, as are most of those conscripted into military service-and the national army depends very heavily on conscription. Paramilitary and guerrilla organizations, too, have long depended on forced recruitment, often of minors. Families in the countryside have been torn apart by paramilitary, military, and guerrilla violence. They have supplied a disproportionate share of the rank-and-file soldiers on all sides of the war-there are few educational opportunities and few jobs in the Colombian countryside. Nor was going to the cities an option that would necessarily benefit campesinos: those who fled to urban areas often lost effective title to their land in the process-decades of war have meant decades of dispossession. And hidden within the statistics on dispossession and displacement are estimates of destruction wrought by land mines: close to ten thousand wounded and two thousand killed over the past twenty-five years. Colombian smallholders who plant and harvest still exist, and wage labor remains a possibility on large ranches and farms that produce food (as well as coffee and flowers) both for the domestic market and for export. But rural earnings are low.
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Even the minority of Colombian farmers who have planted coca have failed to find a path out of poverty. Producers of leaf garner none of the high profits that smugglers of the finished product can expect from cocaine.
Like people in the countryside, those in city neighborhoods have suffered from the long decades of violence. Apart from the criminal use of "false positives," people in city neighborhoods have long been familiar with gang violence and the horrible Orwellian language of "social cleansing," used to describe death squads' attacks on homeless individuals, drug users, homosexuals, and prostitutes living in marginal neighborhoods. Colombian cities have also been the site of mafia-led violence: car bombs, explosions, and assassinations of public figures in broad daylight during the 1980s and 1990s have left memories that linger for those who live in Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín. Wealthy people and middling landowners living in these and smaller cities have also lived with the risk of kidnapping: for the better part of the last few decades, the country's kidnapping rates have remained the highest in the world.
Colombia has seen multiple attempts at peace talks and judicial mechanisms for amnesty that have generally yielded disappointing results. In 1999-2002, Colombian president Andrés Pastrana Arango attempted formal negotiations with the FARC. The failure of that process created a high level of disillusion, which helped give Pastrana's successor, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, an electoral mandate for the hardline approach that became his trademark. Praising the sacrifices made by military personnel and their families, Uribe convinced a majority of voters that an uncompromising approach toward defeating the FARC would improve their lives. The army went on the offensive, and several FARC leaders were killed in military raids that severely weakened the guerrillas. Parallel to that military push, and embracing slogans such as "Colombia Es Pasión" (Colombia Is Passion), Uribe and his government worked to increase domestic vacationing, international tourism, and foreign investment. Winning the war was conceived as a package that included state services, productivity, and leisure. Uribe's supporters praise his passion and his emphasis on security, and they credit him with "retaking" large swaths of the country.
Uribe remained popular even as evidence mounted that the Colombian Army was colluding with death squads and that he had authorized illegal surveillance and wiretapping by Colombia's DAS, or Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (then Colombia's counterpart to the FBI). Scandals involving politicians from his administration and from political parties that supported Uribe pointed to paramilitary influence in local, regional, and national political offices. Because Uribe's opponents alleged that the presi-
